E. Ann Clark, Plant Agriculture, University of Guelph (eaclark@uoguelph.ca)

Presented to the Annual Meeting of the Saskatchewan Institute of Agrologists, April 1999
 

I am a firm believer in the people. If given the truth, they can be depended on to meet any national crisis. The great point is to bring them the real facts. Abraham Lincoln

• When British shoppers were reportedly quite willing to buy tomato paste openly labelled as genetically engineered a few years ago, were they making an informed decision? Did they know the real facts?

• Do Canadian shoppers buying unlabelled transgenic potato products marketed under well known brands know enough to ask whether they should be patronizing these products?

 
• Do American consumers of dairy products realize that rBST was approved by the US FDA based in part on a proponent-written summary of a 90 day feeding trial with 30 rats - a trial which has never been subject to peer review and published? Have they learned that a more critical review of the actual data from same trial revealed major discrepancies between the proponent summary of "no toxicologically significant changes" and the actual trial results showing that range of rBST-induced adverse health effects?⁽¹⁾ Or that this issue contributed to the 14 Jan 99 Canadian decision to reject rBST, despite 9 years of intensive lobbying by Monsanto?

1. Is it the role and responsibility of publicly funded universities to engage in open and objective dialogue to inform citizens and policymakers about technologies with significant known or likely risks?

2. Is the mandate of academic institutions broad enough to accommodate both academic freedom and commercially driven, high-stakes proprietary applications? Should academics be expected to function in service to both society and commercial interests, or will one lead inexorably to the progressive exclusion of the other?

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ACADEMIA. Universities, and specifically, the institution of tenure, are explicitly designed to encourage objective analysis of compelling societal issues by academics, freed from concern about adverse repercussions. The perceived need for academic freedom is so compelling that all modern societies, no matter how small or impoverished, strive to pay the not inconsiderable cost of universities, because creativity, imagination, and exploration are seen as integral to culture and civilization.

Kingman Brewster (1972), then president of Yale, stated: "This spirit of academic freedom within the university has a value which goes beyond protecting the individual's broad scope of thought and inquiry....If a university is alive and productive, it is a place where colleagues are in constant dispute; defending their latest intellectual enthusiasm, attacking the contrary views of others. From this trial by combat emerges a sharper insight, later to be blunted by other, sharper minds. It is vital that this contest be uninhibited by fear of reprisal".

Universities are intentionally structured so that academics will pursue novel research directions and will freely share their findings for the good of society, irrespective of external forces. To a very real extent, academics are expected to challenge societal directions, including the status quo, to continue the quest for new knowledge, and to open up new avenues for enlightenment. That is our job. It follows that to the extent that we fail to perform this function for society - for whatever reason - then we are not doing the unique and privileged job for which we are paid.

The role of academia in informing public opinion is of paramount importance when the issue is a potentially very lucrative, proprietary technology. There can be no better example of this than genetic engineering, which is promoted with exceptional power and influence by the self-proclaimed "life"science companies⁽²⁾.

The Countervailing Role of Government. The current situation is made yet more problematic by the apparent willingness of government, here, there, and everywhere, to abandon its historic responsibility for oversight and regulation in favor of a strongly collegial relationship with industry (Table 1).

Table 1. Collegial relationship between government and the GE industry (from Borger, 1999; Ferrara, 1998; Independent-London, 8 March 99; Kingsnorth, 1998; Tokar, 1998 )
 

Individual	Moved From....	Moved To.....
Jack Watson	Chief of Staff in Carter White House	Monsanto Staff Lawyer
Michael Taylor	Lawyer for firm representing Monsanto when it applied for FDA approval for Posilac	FDA Deputy Commissioner when it was determined that GE foods were substantially equivalent, and hence, not subject to additional testing; he also wrote the FDA's rBST labelling guidelines
	Then back again from the FDA	to long range planning at Monsanto
Margaret Miller	Director of a Monsanto lab working on rBGH	Deputy Director of the FDA Office of New Animal Drugs
Linda Fisher	Mapped pesticide policy in EPA under Bush	Monsanto's Vice President for Governmental Relations
L. Val Giddings	USDA/APHIS regulator	VP for Food and Agriculture at BIO (a Monsanto-backed organization)
Terrence Harvey	FDA	Monsanto
Suzanne Sechen	Graduate student at Cornell, working on several Monsanto-funded rBST studies, under a well known consultant to Monsanto	Primary reviewer for rBST in the FDA Office of New Animal Drugs 1988-1990
Keith Reding	USDA	Monsanto
Sally Van Wert	USDA	AgrEvo
John Gibbon	Chair of Congressional Office of Technological Assessment, while at the same time a Monsanto consultant for more than a decade
Marcia Hale	Former Clinton assistant on intergovernmental relations	Monsanto coordinator of public relations and corporate strategy in UK
Micky Kantor	US Trade Rep and US Secretary of Commerce	Monsanto Board of Directors
David Beier	Senior Director Government Affairs at Genentech, Inc.	Al Gore's Chief Domestic Policy Advisor
Fred Betz	Principal Scientist and regulatory specialist at the EPA, responsible for biopesticide risk assessment and biotech policy	Senior Scientist with environmental consulting firm assisting with GE registrations, and member of the newly appointed NRC GE review panel
John Podesta	Clinton White House Chief of Staff, whose lobbying firm represents pharmaceutical and chemical industry organizations, including Genentech
Nick Weber	Researcher with the USDA (his supervisor is Margaret Miller), who passed confidential Codex documents to Monsanto, prior to the Codex meetings in February 1998 that approved milk from BST-treated cows
Lord Sainsbury	CEO of Sainsbury's (major UK food retailer), Science Minister in the cabinet of Tony Blair, and is also a major shareholder and investor in GM companies
Lord de Ramsey	Chair of the Environment Agency of the UK, who is being paid by Monsanto to test GMO crops on his land holdings

Indeed, government promotional literature on genetic engineering, such as the 1997 CFIA publication Biotechnology in Agriculture, is distinguishable from that of industry only by the Canadian government logo on the front page. e.g.

• "Do you eat bread, cheese, or use antibiotics? Then you have been enjoying the fruits of biotechnology". Nothing to get excited about here, eh?
• How will biotechnology affect you? Biotechnology ....will change the way many common goods and materials are produced...will also generate many new products...will also have major payoffs for Canada's economy.." Emphasis is added to underscore the presumptions of the statement as uncritical acceptance of industry agendas. Not even a whisper of the numerous unanswered questions and potential risks to human health or the environment is revealed. This is unquestionably the statement of a proponent, not an impartial guardian of societal interests⁽³⁾.

Using the 1987 to 1997 interval at the University of Guelph as an example, NSERC funding declined by 27%, Federal funding increased by 16% (primarily in Centers of Excellence, Research Chairs, etc.), provincial funding decreased by 69%, and business/industry funding increased by 117% - all expressed in 1987 dollars (Fig 1). Much of the remaining NSERC and government funding require matching industrial funds or support of some sort.

Thus, while the percentage of total funding that was directly derived from industry has increased from 7% in 1987 to 12.5% in 1997, the degree to which industry agendas influence university research is greater still. The roughly $10 million currently invested by industry to support proprietary research at the University of Guelph mobilizes a sizable share of the provincial funding annually expended to support salaries and other infrastructure at the University of Guelph. The example of Guelph suggests that industrial research of a largely proprietary nature is controlling an increasingly large proportion of the research conducted at publicly funded universities. As stated by Smith (1997):
 

"What corporations desire is a form of socialism in which an exceedingly small level of investment allows them to leverage a vast amount of public funds, thereby displacing the financial risks associated with basic research to the public. But this is a perverse form of socialism, combining the socialization of risks, the privatization of rewards, and the imposition of profound social costs. The more university research is integrated into this perverse socialism, the more pressure will be put on the university as a place of rational inquiry."

The Role of Government Funding. Historically, access to government funding for research by both government and academic scholars has had an important moderating influence on corporate power in the marketplace. For example, much if not all of the research compiled so effectively by Carson (Silent Spring), Colborn and associates (Our Stolen Future), and Steingraber (Living Downstream) was published by government and university researchers. Let no-one mistake the power of the scientific evidence popularized in these books, past and present, to influence public policies for the good of society and the environment.

Now, let us envision the balance between "positive" and "negative" research findings for a given technology in the following hypothetical scenario. Because initial funding for a new technology is often largely if not wholly from the proprietors of the new technology, and assuming they are more likely to continue funding scientists whose outcomes are favorable to the technology, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize an initial wave of predominantly "positive" research publications, serving to gain acceptance for introducing the technology into the marketplace.

Assuming every technology has negative as well as positive implications, a second wave of publications documenting predominantly "negative" aspects might be expected after a lag of some time (Fig. 2). This wave might be expected to emanate largely from a different population of researchers - those without a vested interest in the technology. The funding which supports the second wave of research is also likely to come from a wholly different source - from government acting on behalf of the society whose interests it serves. The second wave is a critical countervail to the proprietary optimism of the first wave, to avoid or at least moderate the worst excesses of the new technology before it is too late.

The "New" Role of Government Funding. But consider how well society would be served if government was no longer willing to act as a watchful guardian of societal interests but became instead an active proponent of the technology⁽⁴⁾. Government money would then be allocated to the same population of researchers as those served by proponent funding. Who then would take responsibility for assessing the potential for negative impacts? Where would the funding come from? And would that second wave start and reach fruition in time to forestall potentially devastating adverse outcomes (Fig 3)?

The need for authoritative and independent analysis, free of conflicts of interest, is redoubled when a technology with potentially far-reaching effects on society and the environment is liberated from government oversight. Where do citizens turn for objective information?

• Canada: A summary of the findings of the Citizens Consensus Conference held in Calgary in early March 1999 reported that "Canadians sorely lack unbiased information about genetically altered food, even though the high tech products are widely available on store shelves, a conference concluded yesterday" (Harrington, 1999). Professional concerns about the objectivity of the panel which wrote the newly released AIC Statement on Biotechnology led the BCIA to pass a resolution rejecting the AIC statement (Appendix I).
• Australia: A similar citizen's jury at the Australian first inaugural Consensus Conference was critical of the Australian and NZ regulatory bodies for not acting in the best interests of society (Smith, 1999). They concluded "The decision-making process is currently inaccessible and open to bias".

And, the Role of Academia? So, returning to the question of the responsibility of publicly funded universities to to inform citizens and policymakers about potentially risky technologies, the answer must be an unequivocal YES. Society pays us to ask the tough but essential questions required to provide them with objective, independent, third party information on critical societal issues Indeed, I would suggest that if the public still doesn't know enough to make an informed decision on buying and consuming genetically engineered foodstuffs, the fault is ours. We have not given them the "real facts", because we have not been asking the right questions. A university system that proves unwilling or unable to supply expert, unbiased analysis of potentially risky technologies, such as genetic engineering, has abrogated its responsibility to the taxpaying public.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND COMMERCE. So, in this era of ever-increasing industry funding, what have we done with this marvellous, empowering, precious gift of academic freedom? Have the administrative leadership and faculty of contemporary universities proven to be trustworthy stewards of our fundamental responsibility for objective, impartial analysis - notwithstanding the allure of all that money? Or, have we violated that trust - perhaps at our own peril?

Industrial Linkages and Research Outcomes. It is difficult to reconcile the premise that universities exist, in part, to provide academic freedom for objective enquiry with the willingness of mainstream universities such as the University of California at Davis⁽⁵⁾ and Berkeley⁽⁶⁾ to sign contracts welcoming Monsanto ($50 million) and Novartis ($80 million), respectively, onto their campuses.

Similar contractual arrangements, which effectively parlay the reputation and resources of publicly funded institutions to the service of a few proprietary interests, are already in place on many campuses. And those too small to land a lucrative institutional arrangement can usually boast a few key players who have signed over part or all of their (largely publicly funded) individual research programs to benefit particular sponsors in return for bales of money, packed labs, and the accolades of peers and administrators alike.

So, does welcoming life science companies into our hallowed halls actually compromise the ability of academics to engage in objective enquiry (Smith, 1997), or is all this carping just sour grapes from disaffected colleagues with "grant-envy"? Let me state it bluntly, so there can be no misunderstanding of intent. Let us test the hypothesis that "money talks", or more specifically, that funding sources can influence the outcome of research. A corollary would be that a research environment dominated by a few, aggressively commercial sources would produce outcomes of benefit to the sponsor - but not necessarily in the best interests of society and the environment. It is acknowledged that bias need not be intentional or even conscious. It should also be recognized that bias can be introduced at any level in the research process, starting with the questions asked (e.g. self-censorship) and proceeding through to the inclusion/omission of findings and the interpretation of results. But regardless of why or how, it is hypothesized that the source of research funding can influence the outcome of the research.

One of the few studies specifically looking at this uncomfortable question was a survey reported by Stelfox et al. (1998), a group of Toronto medical researchers. In a paper in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, they explored the objectivity of sources of published information on the use of calcium-channel blockers, which are used to treat high blood pressure. The controversy over this particular treatment arose because the potential for increased risk of heart attack death from the use of one channel blocker was already known to and reported by the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute in 1995.

In a study of 70 published articles on channel-blockers, Stelfox et al. (1998) used a panel of independent reviewers to categorize the authors of each paper as "supporters", "neutral", or "critical" of channel blockers, and then sent the authors questionnaires to answer questions relating to funding sources (Table 2).

Table 2. Evidence of impact of funding source (from Stelfox et al., 1998)
 

	Supporters	Neutral	Critical
Questions	% with financial ties*
What proportion of the authors in each category have financial ties to the manufacturers of Ca-channel blockers?	96	60	37
What proportion of the authors in each category have financial ties to the manufacturers of other competing products (e.g. beta-blockers?)	88	53	37
What proportion of the authors in each category have financial ties to ANY pharmaceutical manufacturers?	100	67	43

^{*Defined as funds for travel expenses, honorariums for speeches, support for educational programs; research grants; and employment or consulting compensation}

The evidence presented is consistent with the hypothesis that the outcome of the research can be influenced by the funding source. Authors having a history of financial ties to industry, including but not limited to this proprietary product, were most associated with research outcomes favorable to the proprietary product. Conversely, authors with a more limited history of financial support from industry for this or other products tended to reach conclusions critical of the proprietary product. Such a finding, if substantiated in other disciplines, would bode ill for the credibility and reputation of researchers with substantial industry funding, or who had the misfortune of working in an institution with strong industrial linkages.

Industrial Linkages and Academic Integrity. Further challenges to the feasibility of blending commercially driven interests within an institution dedicated to academic freedom derive from the career histories of several people who "dared too much".

Consider the case of Julie Partansky, a member of the City Council of Davis, California, who reportedly had the audacity to suggest that the City should consider reducing use of Roundup in municipal landscaping. In publicly rebuking her, Monsanto's response was informative: "As Monsanto searches for a permanent site for its West Coast operations...how would it look for a company to build a base of operations in a city that has banned, or even thought about banning its major product?" (Sacramento News and Review - UC Davis, Monsanto, and the Future of Biotech; emphasis added). Apparently, even thinking inappropriately about Roundup, and most especially in a university town, is not permitted in Monsanto's world.

If they will do this to someone who is not even associated with a university, consider the implications for someone whose research might actually pose a science-based threat to product sales. The case of FDA veterinarian Richard Burroughs bears some erie similarities to the recent case of the "Ottawa Six", led by Dr. Shiv Chopra (McIlroy, 1998).
 

As reported in Ferrara (1998), Burroughs headed up the review of rBGH for 5 of his 11 years (1979 to 1989) at the FDA Center for Veterinary Sciences. He described a change in the FDA starting in the mid-1980's. "There seemed to be a trend in the place toward approval at any price. It went from a university-like setting where there was independent scientific review to an atmosphere of 'approve, approve, approve'." He described the removal of sick cows from trials and efforts to manipulate data to obscure adverse health responses. He alleged that agency officials "suppressed and manipulated data to cover up their own ignorance and incompetence." Burroughs made his allegations to Congressional investigators, to state legislatures, and to the press. At the end, industry data relating to possible health problems with rBST was submitted to the FDA but withheld from him by his superiors. He was fired for "incompetence" in November 1989.  In 1991, efforts by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate similar cow health problems (mastitis and deformed calves) in rBST trials at the University of Vermont were likewise stifled by the refusal of the FDA, the University of Vermont, and Monsanto to provide original Monsanto test data. The GAO eventually gave up, reportedly due to concerns that "Monsanto had had time to manipulate the questionable data and that any further investigation would be fruitless" (Ferrara, 1998).

So, was Burroughs just a "bad apple" or was his experience indicative of a deeper malaise? Consider the nightmare of Dr. Cate Jenkins, a chemist in the EPA Regulatory Development Branch who blew the whistle on alleged fraud by Monsanto in conjunction with dioxin, a trace contaminant in 2,4,5-T, and hence, in Agent Orange.
 

According to Tokar (1998), Dr. Jenkins stated "Monsanto has in fact submitted false information to EPA which directly resulted in weakened regulations under RCRA (Resources Conservation and Recovery Act) and FIFRA (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act)." She contended that internal Monsanto documents revealed that the proponent had "doctored samples of herbicides that were submitted to the USDA, hid behind process chemistry arguments to deflect attempts to regulate...hid evidence regarding contamination...and excluded several hundred of its sickest former employees from its comparative health studies."  And what did she get for her trouble? Warwick (1998) reported that Monsanto lobbied hard through a two year EPA investigation into her allegations, resulting in a quiet dropping of the criminal investigation and a "campaign of harassment against Dr. Jenkins (which) was only stopped by the Secretary of Labor." Tragically, subsequent findings have borne out her concern about the adverse health effects of dioxin. The World Health Organization recently dropped its safe limit for dioxin intake by 60-90%. Unfortunately, perhaps due in part to the effectiveness of the concerted effort to dismiss a causal relationship between dioxin and human ill health, and hence, to continue selling contaminated products, many of us have already consumed in excess of the newly published "safe limits" (Warwick, 1998).

So, now what to make of this? Two bad apples? A uniquely American affliction? Hard to make that case, given the appalling treatment of Dr. Shiv Chopra and colleagues at the recent rBST hearings in Ottawa⁽⁷⁾, the travails of Dr. Nancy Olivieri (MD) at Sick Kids Hospital in Toronto with Apotex, or earlier still, the appalling after-effects of deregulation which caused Dr. Michelle Brill Edwards to retire in protest from Health Canada in the early 90's.

What about the sorry spectacle of Dr. Arpad Pusztai, an imminent senior scientist and world authority on lectin with a reported 270 publications to his credit. His 35-year career ended shamefully at the hands of his own colleagues at the Rowett Institute in Scotland, which had recently received a grant worth 140,000 British pounds from Monsanto. His crime? Winning a $2.4 million grant over 28 other tenders to study health impacts of GE-lectin on rats, and then reaching - and even worse, publicly reporting (not once but twice, each time with his Director Philip James' permission) - conclusions that challenged the assumption of substantial equivalence in the food safety of GE foodstuffs.

He reported that feeding transgenic potatoes modified to express snowdrop lectin (GNA)⁽⁸⁾ affected the immune response and reduced the size of the liver, heart, and brain of rats. In contrast, unmodified potatoes spiked with GNA had a much lesser effect. From this evidence, he tentatively attributed the adverse responses to the transgenes themselves - not the GNA - and was forced to retire ignominiously two days later.

But what may well be the most disturbing inference, reinforced by Dr. Stanley Ewen, a consulting histopathologist at the University of Aberdeen Medical School, was that the adverse effect may have come not from the lectin transgenes but from the promoter genes (derived from cauliflower mosaic virus (CaMV)) which were used to drive the expression of the transgene within the potato genome. The CaMV promoter has been widely used in making GE tomatoes, corn, and soybean cultivars, the products of which are already in the marketplace in hundreds of commercial products (Gillard et al., 1999). Both the "substantial equivalence" of these commercial products and of Dr. Pusztai's potatoes, as well as the premise of substantial equivalence per se, is clearly drawn into question by these results.

According to Dr. Ronald Finn, past president of the British Society of Allergy and Environmental Medicine, "Dr. Pusztai's results, at the very least, raise the suspicion that genetically modified food may damage the immune system" (Lean, 1999).

Dr. Jonathan Rhodes, professor of Medicine at Liverpool University, stated: "One key problem that keeps coming back ...is that regulation of food is nothing like as strict as regulation of drugs. And when you start tinkering around with the genetic structure of food, you have to move toward thinking of food products as pharmaceuticals" (Dyer, 1999).

Perhaps not coincidentally, a separate study conducted at the York Nutritional Laboratory in Great Britain recently reported a 50% increase in soybean-related allergic responses (Townsend, 1999). For the first time in 17 years of testing, soybean is now among the top 10 vegetables causing allergic responses in humans. Allergic responses were detected using blood antibody levels in a study involving 4500 people. Soybeans reportedly caused a range of other responses in sensitive people, such as irritable bowel syndrome, digestion problems, and skin complaints. John Graham, speaking on behalf of the York research team, stated that "People also suffered neurological problems with chronic fatigue syndrome, headaches, and lethargy. It is worrying... We believe this raises serious new questions about the safety of GM foods because it is impossible to guarantee that the soya used in the tests were GM-free."

So what are we seeing here? Yet more incompetent, bumbling scientists, hysterical greenies, or ..... what? Or, are they merely objective scientists, trying to do their job, in a collegial environment that is genuinely hostile to objective enquiry? And what of academic integrity? When scientists have to put their jobs - their careers - at risk just to do their job, then academic integrity is already in question. As the stakes get higher and higher, financially and professionally, the pressure to conform, to ask the "right" questions, and to publish the "right" results can only increase - to the detriment of us all.
 

As Dr. Pusztai stated himself, "I believe in the technology. But it is too new for us to be absolutely sure that what we are doing is right. But I can say from my experience if anyone dares to say anything even slightly contra-indicative, they are vilified and totally destroyed." When asked about what could happen to those who might try to repeat his work elsewhere, he responded "It would have to be a very strong person. If I, with my international reputation, can be destroyed, who will stand up?" (Lean, 1999).

Who indeed? Consider the decision which has been taken by so many universities to accept or even solicit industrial linkages for either individual faculty members or entire institutions. Will these decisions of short-term expedience modify and perhaps fundamentally alter the role and relevance of universities to society in the future?

A Visit to Shapiro University. The year is 2010, and we are visiting a university recently renamed to honor the CEO of its main industrial sponsor in the late 1990's. Shapiro U is still beaming with productive scientists 12 years after forming a lucrative relationship with a major life science company - GreenGenes. GreenGenes was formed by the merger of Monsanto, Novartis, and DuPont in 2002, and is now the single largest economy in the world. Let's take a peek at the faculty and grad students at Shapiro U. to get a glimpse of the future that is awaiting us.

Perhaps we catch Professor Smith momentarily contemplating a proposal to assess environmental risks or human health implications of insecticidal plants, or even more audaciously, to validate the "higher yield" claims of GE crops. But of course, as he sheepishly admits, only someone with a death wish would be stupid enough to try that kind of suicidal stunt at Shapiro U, right?! After wishing for just the briefest moment that he'd landed a job at a more traditional university, he abandons such whimsy, applies self-censorship, and returns to his work on herbicide resistance.

Next, we run into young Andy Jones, who is halfway through his PhD and is already being courted by the department to fill yet another newly funded position in the biotechnology stable. What attributes is he exhibiting that make him such an attractive candidate? He brims with self-confidence because he knows how to:

• practice self-censorship;
• abstain from talking to colleagues about his research;
• excel in producing patentable goods for commerce; and
• avoid unproductive teaching time, which detracts from achieving patentable goals; all of which sounds a lot like learning to
• behave like someone employed by industry, which is his "big league" aspiration after honing his skills for a few years in the "minors" at Shapiro U.

So, what do you think? Is this the kind of university you want to see, where you would be happy to work? Is the academic climate of Shapiro U. compatible with the historic role of universities to foster independent, objective enquiry to the service of society? Given the real-world examples of influencing both research outcomes and personal careers, does this vision really seem so outlandish? Outrageous? Or even, avoidable?

Conclusions

    The mutually beneficial and symbiotic relationship between universities and society is in jeopardy. The burgeoning presence of industry on campus, filling the vacuum created by short-sighted government funding policies and deregulation, has created an irreconcilable conflict. Academic freedom to provide objective and independent insight bearing on societal issues is in direct conflict with the demands of fueling proprietary technologies. The inherently unstable balance between fulfilling these two competing demands has already shifted in favor of the latter, with grave implications for society, and for the institution of the university as a whole.

Evidence has been presented of the personal and professional devastation caused by imposing these two competing demands on individual scientists. Taken individually, it is possible to discount or even dismiss these unfortunate scientists as loose cannons or worse - which is exactly what was done to them. But in the aggregate, and these are just a selected subsample of a larger dataset, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that something is seriously wrong, and getting worse, at our universities.

So, what is to be done? For starters, consider:

1. For every dollar invested in university research by industry or government, require the same amount of industry or government money be deposited in an independently administered fund to support competitive research into the risks and hazards of the same technology.

2. To the extent that university research is considered critical to support proprietary industrial products, create separate satellite research institutes affiliated with universities but fully funded by industry. Let the risks as well as the benefits of technology be fully borne by the proprietor of the technology, and redirect societal funding to support nonproprietary research beneficial to all. Reaffirm the value of academic research on university campuses to support the interests of society and the environment.

3. Inform government policymakers and private citizens of the dangers posed by the progressive industrialization of the academic environment, and hence, of the threat to balanced, objective decision-making in the interests of society and the environment.

Borger, J. 1999. Why Americans are happy to swallow the GM food experiment. The Guardian 20 February 99

Brewster, Kingman. 1972. On tenure. AAUP Bulletin 58(4):382-383.

CFIA (Canadian Food and Inspection Agency). 1997. Biotechnology in Agriculture.

Clark, E. Ann. 1999. Debunking the myths of genetic engineering of field crops.

Dyer, G. 1999. Frankenstein foods. Globe and Mail, Saturday 20 February 99

Ferrara, J. 1999. Revolving doors: Monsanto and the regulators. The Ecologist 28(5):280-286.

Harrington, C. 1999. Conference scrutinizes designer food. Canadian Press (Calgary)

Kingsnorth, P. 1998. Bovine growth hormones. The Ecologist 28(5):266-269.

Lean, G. 1999. How I told the truth and was sacked. Independent (8 March 99).

McIlroy,A. 1998. Ottawa tried to control scientists' testimony. Globe and Mail News 27 October 98.

Mendelson, J. 1998. Roundup: the world's biggest-selling herbicide. The Ecologist 28(5):270-275.

Pimentel, D. H. Acquay, M. Biltonen, P. Rice, M. Silva, J. Nelson, V. Lipner, S. Giordano, A. Horowitz, and M. D'Amore. 1992. Environmental and social costs of pesticides. In: D. Pimentel and H. Lehman (ed) The Pesticide Question. Environment, Economics, and Ethics. Chapman and Hall, New York.

Sholubi, O., D.P. Stonehouse, and E. Ann Clark. 1996. Environmental and economic benefits of organic dairy farming in Ontario. pp. 151-156. W. Lockeretz (ed) Environmental Enhancement through Agriculture, Boston, MA 334 pp.

Sholubi, O, D.P. Stonehouse, and E. Ann Clark. 1997 Profile of organic dairy farming in Ontario. Amer. J. Altern. Agric. 12(3):133-139.

Sholubi, O, D.P. Stonehouse, and E. Ann Clark. Comparison of organic and conventional dairy farms in Ontario. Amer. J. Altern. Agric. (accepted)

Smith, T. 1997. Some remarks on univesity/business relations, technological development, and the public good.

Smith, D. 1999. Label gene food, says jury. Sydney Morning Herald.

Tokar, B. 1998. Monsanto: a checkered history. The Ecologist 28(5):254-261.

Townsend, M. 1999. Why soya is a hidden destroyer. Daily Express 12 March 99.

Warwick, H. 1998. Agent Orange: the poisoning of Vietnam. The Ecologist 28(5):264-265.

Winfield, M. 1999. Director of Research. Canadian Institute of Environmental Law and Policy. Personal communication.

1. Based on the 90 day rat trial, the FDA did not oblige Monsanto to conduct human toxicological tests, spanning 2 years and involving hundreds of rats, which are otherwise required for veterinary pharmaceuticals. In fact, the original Monsanto-run trial which reported "no toxicologically significant responses" had actually found that 20-30% of the rats exhibited immunological reactions, with some male rats exhibiting cyst formation in the thyroid, a warning signal for cancer.

2. Although not the focus of the present talk, ample evidence exists to dispute the premise that the pest and weed control afforded by agrochemicals can be justified as an essential support for human life. Pest and weed control can be and are achieved in organic and IPM systems with limited or no dependence on biocides. Over 60% of all biocide applications are to produce livestock feed. Meat and milk can be - and are - produced on grass instead of confinement, drastically reducing dependence on both biocides and pharmaceuticals (Sholubi et al., 1996, 1997, and accepted). The current feasibility of biocide-free food production, in spite of a virtual vacuum in research and extension support, is but a promise of what could be achieved on even a fraction of the billions spent on conventional, resource-intensive agriculture.

3. Although outside the purview of this paper, the inference that "what is good for industry is good for society" (and hence, deserves unconditional government support) can and should be subject to challenge, rather than just accepted as a given. Consider, for example, the findings of Pimentel et al. (1992) on the involuntary externalizing of biocide costs to society and the environment. Or consider what proportion of the population would consider that BST is "good" for society?

4. It is difficult to imagine a clearer illustration of the degree to which government has become a proponent of genetic engineering than the behavior of the governments of the US, Canada, Australia and three other countries in forcing industry agendas on world trade, against the explicit and fervent wishes of 130 other countries at the recent Biosafety Protocol debacle (see Clark, 1999).

5. My alma matter

6. My father's alma mater

7. McIlroy (1998) revealed internal government documents, dated 20 Oct 98, showing that contrary to the 2 October promise by Health Minister Allan Rock of "no reprisals" to the six Ottawa scientists, their boss and head of the Health Protection Branch was to be sent to appear at the hearing to "lead" them and "intervene as required". Efforts to "engineer" his participation at the hearing were unsuccessful, when the committee declined the request for his participation.

8. snowdrop lectin is not known to be toxic to mammalian systems, which is why it was used, unlike ConA lectin (taken from Jackbean) which is known to be toxic to mammals. Like alkaloids or tannins, lectins are ubiquitous vehicles to deter herbivory, can be isolated from many types of organisms, and have been widely explored for potential use in transgenic plants.. According to Cummins (internet communication 19 September 98), patents have been issued for lectin genes in jacalin, elderberry, osage orange, and more than 50 other species (US Patent 5,407,454), in barley ((US Patent 5,276,269), in soybean (US Patent 5,604,121), in snowdrop (US Patent 5,545,820), in pea (US Patent EP-A-0351924), and other lectins (US Patent EP-A-0427529). He further reported that field trials of transgenic lectin-modified crops have already been conducted for potatoes, maize, walnut, sunflower, and grapes.